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Daniel J. Solove is associate professor, George Washington University Law School; 
J.D. Yale. The author would like to thank Jake Barnes for his help in the tort law 
discussions of this chapter. To the extent my knowledge of tort law is accurate, 
I accept full responsibility. As for the errors, blame Jake. Chris Hoofnagle, Ted 
Janger, and Paul Schwartz provided helpful comments on the manuscript. This 
book chapter was originally written in 2004. Subsequent to the redrafting of this 
chapter, in 2005, a litany of organizations announced that they had suffered 
massive data security breaches. I have updated this chapter slightly to discuss 
the 2005 data security breaches, but I am unable to add more to discuss the legal 
developments in the aftermath of the breaches. By and large, these developments 
have unfolded as I predicted back in 2004 when writing this chapter.
Data security is quickly becoming one of the major concerns of the Informa-
tion Age. Computer networks are vulnerable to siege from hackers, viruses, 
intercepted communications, and electronic surveillance.1 Much of the data 
residing in these computer networks pertains to our personal lives. Increas-
ingly, extensive digital dossiers about us are being constructed, as businesses 
and the government gather pieces of personal data and assemble them in 
data bases. Hundreds—perhaps thousands—of entities may have our per-
sonal information.2 Our dossiers play a profound role in our lives. They are 
used to assess our reputation and credibility. They are examined to determine 
whether we receive a loan, a job, or a license—and even whether we are de-
tained or arrested by the police. Because so many critical decisions are based 
on our dossiers,  ensuring that they are accurate and protected from tamper-
ing is of paramount importance.
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Unfortunately, our dossiers are virtually unguarded. Anybody can readily 
tap into our dossiers—and they do. Identity theft—the use of personal informa-
tion to illegally access existing financial accounts, open fraudulent accounts, or 
obtain credit cards in other people’s names—is the most rapidly growing type of 
white-collar criminal activity.3 Complaints of identity theft in the United States 
rose a staggering 88 percent from 2001 to 2002.4 According to a Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) estimate in September 2003, “almost 10 million Americans 
have discovered that they were the victim of some form of ID Theft within the 
past year.”5 Collectively, victims labored for almost three hundred million hours 
to resolve the tribulations caused by identity theft.6 The FTC estimates that con-
sumers lost $5 billion due to identity theft and other information abuses.7
In February 2005, ChoicePoint, one of the largest database companies, 
announced that records containing extensive information about more than 
145,000 people had been improperly accessed.8 The number was later revised 
upward to encompass more than 160,000 individuals.9 The breach sparked ex-
tensive media attention. Soon afterward, a cascade of announcements of data 
leaks and breaches from other companies followed. For example, another of 
the largest database companies, LexisNexis, announced a security breach in-
volving personal information on more than 310,000 people.10 Bank of America 
leaked data on about 1.2 million federal employees.11 Countless other compa-
nies, government agencies, and educational institutions announced that they 
had leaked personal information.12 In all, more than one hundred million re-
cords of personal information were leaked.13
Although abuses of personal information are becoming ubiquitous in the 
digital age, not enough thought has been given to how the law should under-
stand and address these problems. Frequently, the misuse of personal informa-
tion is viewed as a technology problem. Indeed, given the ease in which hackers 
can break into computer systems and data can be intercepted in transmission, 
there are bound to be significant security problems. As Helen Nissenbaum 
observes, “[e]xperts in computer security are worried about . . . malicious, 
avaricious, incompetent, or simply unauthorized outsiders who may break 
into our online space, damage or steal information, and destroy or compro-
mise our systems.”14 Indeed, many companies use encryption to transmit data 
securely and fortify their computer systems with firewalls to prevent hackers 
from gaining access.15
However, technology is not the root cause of many abuses of personal in-
formation. The shift to a digital environment certainly facilitates information 
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misuse, but at the core, the problem stems from a set of business and govern-
ment practices. The problem is caused in significant part by the law, which 
has allowed the construction and use of digital dossiers without adequately 
regulating the practices by which companies keep them secure. Despite tak-
ing elaborate technological measures to protect their data systems, companies 
readily disseminate the personal information they have collected to a host 
of other entities and sometimes even to anyone willing to pay a small fee. 
Companies provide access to their record systems over the phone to anybody 
in possession of a few easy-to-find pieces of personal information. Even a for-
tress with impenetrable walls is hardly secure if the back gate is left open.
Reforming this problematic state of affairs requires a rethinking of the 
way the law comprehends the abuse of personal information. The law fails 
to focus on the causes of information abuses; it has not identified all the re-
sponsible parties; and it has not fashioned appropriate remedies to respond 
to these abuses. This chapter sketches a new way to think about information 
abuses, their causes, and the way they should be remedied. Part I examines 
what I call the “data abuse pyramid.” The data abuse pyramid is a way to rep-
resent how and why many types of information abuses occur. At the top of the 
pyramid is “misuse” of our data, when information is employed to carry out 
identity theft, fraud, or other activities. A level below are “leaks”—when enti-
ties improperly release or provide access to personal information. And at the 
bottom is “insecurity,” which involves the general lack of protection accorded 
to our personal data by the entities that hold it. The law attempts to respond 
at the top of the pyramid, but I contend that to stop information misuse, the 
law must become involved at the lower levels of the pyramid. In short, the law 
must address leaks and insecurity. Part II explores how the law can develop 
to accomplish this task. I recommend ways that existing legal concepts can be 
modified to more effectively redress and deter information abuses.
I. THE DATA ABUSE PYRAMID
To understand the information abuses that are occurring today, we need to 
understand the data abuse pyramid (Figure 6.1). The pyramid is meant to 
be a rather simple model, and it is not designed to represent all information 
abuses. But it does serve as a useful model for a large percentage of the abuses 
of our personal data.
There are three levels in the pyramid. I begin with the misuse of personal 
information, on which the law focuses most heavily, and I then work my way 
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down. It is important to distinguish between the different levels of the pyra-
mid because the law responds differently at each level.
A. Misuse
At the top level of the pyramid is the misuse of personal information. Personal 
data can be misused for identity theft, fraud, stalking, abusive marketing (for 
example, spam or telemarketing), and spying on people. These misuses cause 
concrete injuries—financial losses, emotional distress, and even physical 
violence.
Identity theft is a nightmare for victims. The identity thief uses a victim’s 
personal information to obtain loans, open fraudulent accounts, and loot 
 existing accounts. As these abuses occur, the victim’s dossier becomes pol-
luted with erroneous information—unpaid debts, traffic violations, arrests, 
and other discrediting data. Because an identity thief impersonates the victim 
using the victim’s personal information, law enforcement databases some-
times associate the victim’s name with the thief ’s criminal activities.
Victims can spend years desperately attempting to fix the destruction 
wrought by the identity thief.16 Victims experience great anxiety, leading to 
psychological harm in certain cases.17 They have difficulty “obtaining loans, 
mortgages, security clearances, promotions and even gaining employment.”18 
Sometimes, victims are arrested on the basis of warrants for the crimes of the 
identity thieves.19 In the words of one victim, “[w]hat has taken me a lifetime 
to build—my trust, my integrity, and my identity—has been tainted.”20
In addition to identity thieves, stalkers use personal information to track 
down people to harass or even kill them. For example, in 1989 a deranged fan 
brutally murdered actress Rebecca Shaeffer outside her home. He located her 
home address with the assistance of a private investigator who obtained it 
from California motor vehicles records.21
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The law attempts to respond to actual misuses of information. This is be-
cause having one’s identity stolen, being stalked, or suffering an attack or ha-
rassment are all harms that manifest themselves concretely. We can readily 
comprehend the damage, and we can assess financial losses, physical harm, 
and emotional trauma. Existing legal responses to data security problems focus 
on the identity thieves and other criminal miscreants who misuse our infor-
mation. Indeed, the predominant approach to dealing with identity theft has 
been to pass new criminal laws.22 In 1998, Congress passed the Identity Theft 
and Assumption Deterrence Act, making identity theft a federal crime.23
However, using criminal law as the main legal method to combat infor-
mation abuses has thus far proven ineffective. Law enforcement officials lack 
enough resources to prosecute identity theft, which is seen as a minor crime 
when compared to violent crime and drug offenses.24 Identity thieves are dif-
ficult to catch. An identity theft often occurs in many different locations, 
and law enforcement officials “sometimes tend to view identity theft as being 
‘someone else’s problem.’”25 Most identity theft crimes remain unsolved.26 In 
one estimate, less than one in seven hundred instances of identity theft result 
in a conviction.27 The focus on criminal law results in inadequate deterrence of 
identity theft, and it does little to help the victims whose lives are upended.
Victims can attempt to seek redress under tort law, but suing the male-
factor who abuses the information will often be futile. The misuser is often 
too hard to track down and doesn’t have deep pockets. Victims can also try 
to sue the companies from which the information was taken or the compa-
nies that enable the thief to set up an account in the victim’s name. Although 
the harm is easy to understand, the law must also recognize that a duty was 
breached and that this breach caused the harm. These elements are more dif-
ficult to establish. The law often views the primary culprit as the thief, the 
hacker, or the abuser of the data. The companies from which the data is taken 
are perceived as victims themselves, because they often also suffer financial 
losses from identity theft.
Even if the law were to view companies that allow improper access to per-
sonal information to be at fault, there are still several impediments to a suc-
cessful suit. It can take a very long time for a concrete injury to materialize. 
Personal information may be improperly disseminated yet only years later be 
used for identity theft.
Furthermore, it is often difficult to trace where an identity thief obtained 
the personal information used to commit the crime.28 Many sources hold our 
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personal information. Whereas a stolen piece of physical property can only 
exist in one location at a time, information can exist in many different hands 
simultaneously, all of which can spread it further. Unless we can trace where 
the thief gets his or her information, it will be difficult to link a concrete in-
jury to a particular entity that failed to keep data secure. For those companies 
that allow the identity thief to pollute a victim’s dossier—by carelessly grant-
ing credit or allowing improper access to an account—it is easier to single out 
the offending companies. However, there often are many participants that 
contribute to the harm experienced by identity theft victims: the government 
agencies and businesses that provide access to the personal information used 
by the thief, the companies that allow the thief to access and open accounts, 
the creditors that report the unpaid bills, and the credit reporting agencies 
that assemble this faulty information and then use it to report on people’s 
reputations. Thieves may obtain information to begin the identity theft from 
one source; supplement it from other sources; and then go to other compa-
nies to obtain credit, open accounts, and obtain credit cards. When the bills 
are not paid, these companies give damaging information to credit reporting 
agencies. This defiles a person’s credit reputation, which can harm a person 
who wants to obtain a mortgage, loan, or job. When the victim attempts to de-
contaminate her dossier, she is often stymied by uncooperative credit report-
ing agencies and creditors, and even after the victim manages to go through a 
time-consuming and lengthy process to clean out the faulty data, more pollu-
tion continues to pour into her dossier. The harms of identity theft, therefore, 
are created through a collaborative effort.
In its most recent attempt to address identity theft, Congress passed the 
Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) in 2003.29 The FACTA 
contains some helpful measures to deal with identity theft. People are allowed 
to request a yearly free credit report from each of the three national credit re-
porting agencies. FACTA also allows people to opt out of offers of prescreened 
credit, which are direct mailings that can be intercepted by identity thieves. 
The Act mandates that when a person places a “fraud alert” in his or her credit 
file, the credit reporting agency must contact all the other credit reporting 
agencies to do likewise. Moreover, the FACTA allows victims to obtain re-
cords from businesses that issued credit in their name to an imposter.
Although the FACTA makes it somewhat easier for victims to ameliorate 
the damage caused by identity theft, this is nothing but a better band-aid. 
Several of the FACTA’s provisions merely codify what credit reporting agen-
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cies had been doing voluntarily, such as contacting the other credit reporting 
agencies when a fraud alert is placed in a person’s file and providing people 
with free copies of their credit reports. And to counterbalance these benefits, 
the FACTA preempts more protective state laws. In the end, the FACTA does 
little to make our personal information more secure. Its reforms are remedial, 
and it fails to proactively prevent identity theft.
How can the law respond more effectively? To do so, the law must better 
understand and rectify the abuses that occur earlier on before misuses such 
as identity theft occur.
B. Leaks
The second level of the pyramid involves instances when a company leaks per-
sonal information or allows it to be accessed improperly. I refer to this prob-
lem as “leaks” because information has been disseminated improperly and it 
is now somewhere beyond the control of the entity that leaked it. As discussed 
earlier, since 2005, scores of institutions have in combination leaked over one 
hundred million records. The problem existed long before 2005. For example, 
prior to 2005, the credit reports maintained by Ford Motor Company of about 
thirteen thousand people were accessed illegally.30 A corrupt employee of a 
company peddled thirty thousand credit reports.31 The University of Mon-
tana Website accidentally posted psychological records of over sixty children 
on the Internet.32 Leaked information is often a precursor to a misuse such as 
identity theft. However, there are many instances in which information has 
been leaked without any resulting misuse.
With a leak, the harm consists in being exposed to the potential for being 
subjected to identity theft, fraud, or even physical danger. People may also 
suffer anxiety because there is little they can then do to recover the data and 
prevent downstream abuses of them. However, the law has difficulty in recog-
nizing a harm. The law can at least recognize that a company may have done 
something wrong. When information is leaked, people may be exposed to a 
greater risk of identity theft or other abuse even though only a subset of those 
will actually be victimized. A harm has occurred, because a person is worse 
off than he or she would have been before the leak. Nevertheless, many leaks 
do not result in immediate injury. A concrete injury may never materialize. Or 
it could happen years later, far beyond any statute of limitations. Until such an 
injury occurs, the law will not view the situation as ripe for a remedy because 
the real harm is understood as being the actual misuse of the information, not 
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the mere exposure to the possibility of such misuse. Even if a misuse such as 
identity theft occurs, it is often hard to trace it to the leaked information.
C. Insecurity
At the bottom of the pyramid is insecurity. Here, the data isn’t leaked, but 
the information security is shoddy. Our digital dossiers can be insecure on 
numerous fronts. They can be left virtually unlocked for easy access, and they 
can be left inadequately protected against contamination with false data.
Insecurity is a problem of “architecture.” As it is traditionally used, archi-
tecture refers to the design of physical structures or spaces. Information law 
scholars, however, have been using the term to describe information infra-
structures. Lawrence Lessig and Joel Reidenberg have pointed out that com-
puter systems have an architecture.33 This architecture is not just a bunch of 
wires, memory chips, and hard drives; it also encompasses computer code.
The manner in which data is accessed and used is also an architectural 
matter. Information systems are designed to grant access to certain people 
and to deny access to others. For example, an ATM card allows access through 
possession of the physical card as well as a password (the PIN number). Com-
panies often focus on improving the technological architecture to guard 
against unauthorized access to their computer networks, such as by using en-
cryption and firewalls. But the security problems with our digital dossiers are 
often not caused by invasive technologies or by breakdowns in technologi-
cal architecture. Rather, these problems are caused by certain practices of the 
government and businesses.
One such practice involves the degree of supervision and control that a 
company exercises over its own employees. According to Bruce Schneier, com-
puter security cannot be effective unless the people who use the computers 
also maintain good security practices.34 Numerous employees may have ac-
cess to a database, and some unscrupulous ones may pilfer data for use in 
identity theft. The FTC has noted the strong growth of “insider threats,” when 
employees funnel data to identity thieves or abscond with information.35 An-
other practice that jeopardizes the security of our personal data is the selling 
of them to others, because all it takes is a weak link in the chain for data secu-
rity to be seriously compromised.
The central security flaw is the ease by which data can be accessed from the 
outside through relatively low-tech means. The social security number (SSN) 
is at the heart of this problem. Today, SSNs are used as passwords by countless 
businesses, banks, hospitals, schools, and other institutions to access personal 
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data and accounts.36 Businesses assume that whoever knows your SSN must 
be you. Because the SSN is used so frequently by a wide range of institutions 
as an identifier, it becomes a kind of magic key to our digital dossiers. With an 
SSN, an identity thief can gain access to a person’s existing accounts, apply for 
credit in the victim’s name, open accounts under the name of the victim, and 
obtain even more information about the victim for further use.37
The problem is that the SSN is a terrible password. Numerous people and 
organizations know our SSNs: employers, government agencies, credit report-
ing agencies, creditors, hospitals, and schools. Because SSNs often are used on 
ID cards or as driver license numbers, when a person loses his or her wallet, 
the person’s SSN is also exposed. SSNs appear on countless documents that in-
evitably wind their way into the trash to be plucked away by identity thieves.38 
Even if people take the time to shred their trash, thieves can still get their SSNs. 
The numerous employees at schools, government agencies, and businesses may 
discard documents with a person’s SSN without shredding them. Employees 
might steal the documents or copy the numbers from the documents. More-
over, SSNs are routinely sold by database companies to any interested buyer.39 
In one instance, an identity thief bought from database companies the SSNs of 
several top corporate executives.40 The SSNs of major government officials, in-
cluding Attorney General John Ashcroft and CIA Director George Tenet, were 
being sold on the Internet for $26 apiece.41 SSNs are also disclosed in certain 
public records.42 As a result of the widespread use of SSNs, anybody who wants 
to find out a person’s SSN can do so with minimal effort.
Some banks and companies also require people to supply additional infor-
mation such as addresses, birth dates, or mothers’ maiden names.43 But all this 
information is often disclosed by the government in public record systems.44
Not only does insecurity allow unauthorized access to our personal infor-
mation, it also results in our dossiers becoming defiled with corrupt informa-
tion. Credit reporting agencies maintain detailed dossiers about people, which 
they provide to creditors to assess a person’s creditworthiness before offering 
them a loan.45 Many employers also examine the credit reports of prospec-
tive hires as part of a background check. State licensing entities, such as state 
bar organizations, often require applicants to submit a credit report. Because 
credit reporting agencies work only for the creditors and do not establish a 
relationship with us, we have scant participation in how they use our informa-
tion, and there are not sufficient market incentives to ensure that a particular 
person’s report is accurate.
120 DANIEL J. SOLOVE
Creditors are also to blame, as they often are careless in granting credit. 
By one estimate, financial institutions mail over three billion preapproved 
credit card mailings each year.46 People can readily apply for instant credit 
in stores or over the Internet. And they can easily do this in another person’s 
name—all they need is that person’s SSN, address, and date of birth. Lynn 
LoPucki observes that “creditors and credit-reporting agencies often lack both 
the means and the incentives to correctly identify the persons who seek credit 
from them or on whom they report.”47
Therefore, identity theft does not just happen. It has been constructed. 
The SSN was manufactured by the government. Originally not to be used for 
identification,48 it began to be used almost everywhere for just this purpose.49 
Congress recognized the problem in the early 1970s, and passed the Privacy 
Act of 1974 to restrict the growing use of SSNs as identifiers.50 But the Act 
made a critical mistake—it did nothing to restrict the use of the SSN by busi-
nesses or other nongovernment institutions.
This is an architectural system—constructed by the government and 
by businesses—that makes us all woefully insecure. The government has 
stamped us with an identification number without providing adequate regu-
lation on its use. Companies routinely allow access to our information with 
the SSN as a password, which leaves our data virtually undefended. As this 
discussion has demonstrated, the architectural problem is not in the design of 
technology but in the practices for how entities use, disseminate, and provide 
access to our personal information.
Typically, those discussing information architectures focus on what Lessig 
calls “architectures of control.”51 Architectures of control are constraining; 
they are designed to keep people under control. In the early days of the In-
ternet, commentators celebrated its openness and freedom. Lessig, however, 
saw a more ominous future: “Cyberspace does not guarantee its own freedom 
but instead carries an extraordinary potential for control.”52 Through com-
puter code and legal code, the Internet can become one of the most controlled 
places on the planet.
Architectures of control are a serious problem, but architecture works in 
other troublesome ways. In particular, we are witnessing the increasing con-
struction of what I call “architectures of vulnerability.”53 Whereas architec-
tures of control restrict people’s freedom, architectures of vulnerability ex-
pose people to a myriad of perils. They sap people of their power.
The key point is that architecture itself can cause harm. If police protection 
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of a neighborhood were taken away, and all the locks to people’s homes were re-
moved, this would be a precarious situation to live in, even if nothing happened. 
Architectures of vulnerability cause harm not only by creating emotional dis-
tress and anxiety but also by increasing our risks of being victimized by identity 
theft, fraud, stalking, or other crimes. This increased risk is itself a harm.
Unfortunately, the law does little to redress insecurity. Insecurity seems too 
“soft” to be a cognizable injury. When companies provide incompetent data se-
curity, not only has a concrete injury failed to materialize, but also nothing has 
happened. Hackers haven’t hacked it. Identity thieves haven’t exploited it. Noth-
ing has been leaked. If somebody leaves the back door ajar, but no burglars come 
in, then it is difficult for the law to view the situation as ripe for a remedy.
By neglecting to recognize insecurity as a harm, the law is failing in its re-
sponse to the escalating abuses of personal data. The law is prepared to rectify 
misuses, but this is often too little, too late. The problem emerges much earlier 
on—with leaks and inadequate data security. Pursuing the misusers of infor-
mation has proven to be ineffectual. To stop the misuse, the law must begin to 
focus on the locus of the problem—on leaks and insecurity.
II. RETHINKING REMEDIES
Existing legal responses to data security leave the architecture of vulnerabil-
ity unchanged. They patch up the cracks in the surface, but the foundations 
remain shaky. The law must shift its focus from the top of the data abuse 
pyramid (misuse) to the lower levels (leaks, insecurity). Can the law evolve to 
recognize leaks and insecurity as harms?
A. Shifting the Focus to Security Practices
At the core of the problems with data security is a set of business and govern-
ment practices. We need to restructure our relationships with businesses and 
the government with regard to how they treat us when they collect and use our 
personal data. Currently, the collectors and users of our personal information 
are frequently not accountable to us. Information is gathered and used, and 
we have little knowledge about and ability to control how secure it remains.
To what extent do the companies that collect and use our personal infor-
mation owe duties to us? This question remains surprisingly unanswered in 
the law. However, there are signs that courts are beginning to recognize that 
the entities using our personal data do have duties to us. For example, in Rems-
burg v. Docusearch, Inc.,54 a man named Liam Youens bought data about Amy 
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Lynn Boyer from Docusearch, a database company that maintains personal 
information dossiers on people. Youens requested Boyer’s SSN, and Docu-
search quickly provided it to him. He then asked for the address of  Boyer’s 
employer. Docusearch hired a person to find out by calling Boyer, lying to her 
about the reason for the call, and inducing Boyer to reveal the address. Docu-
search then gave the address to Youens, who went to Boyer’s workplace and 
murdered her. The court held that although ordinarily private parties have “no 
general duty to protect others from the criminal attacks of third parties,” when 
“the defendant’s conduct has created an unreasonable risk of criminal miscon-
duct, a duty is owed to those foreseeably endangered.”55 A private investigator 
“owes a duty to exercise reasonable care not to subject the third person to an 
unreasonable risk of harm.”56 Therefore, “threats posed by stalking and iden-
tity theft lead us to conclude that the risk of criminal misconduct is sufficiently 
foreseeable so that an investigator has a duty to exercise reasonable care in 
disclosing a third person’s personal information to a client.”57 Remsburg is an 
important step forward in recognizing and remedying modern information 
privacy harms. Remsburg appropriately recognizes the duty that data collec-
tors and users have to the people whose information they maintain.
Another way to locate duties is by analogizing our relationship with the 
data collectors and users to a fiduciary one. A fiduciary relationship is one in 
which a person standing in a special position of power owes special duties to 
the person subjected to that power.58 The most famous description of fiduciary 
duties was penned by Justice Benjamin Cardozo: “Many forms of conduct per-
missible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s length, are forbidden to 
those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the 
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor 
the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.”59
In the privacy context, suits have been brought under the tort of breach 
of confidentiality when personal information is leaked.60 The virtue of the 
breach of fiduciary duty approach is that this tort understands the breach to 
be the harm. Jessica Litman proposes that the breach of confidentiality tort 
apply to companies that trade in personal information.61 In particular, she 
contends, the “reuse, correlation, and sale of consumer transaction data is 
a straightforward breach of trust.”62 Litman, however, recognizes that the 
“payoff” of such a tort remedy would be “modest.”63 For Litman, the central 
problem with common law tort is that it is “gradual and slow” to develop, and 
“anything so slow is likely to deliver too little, too late.”64 Litman has in mind 
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intentional transfers of data, not data insecurity. However, because fiduciary 
duties extend beyond a duty of confidentiality, plaintiffs may be able to sue for 
a breach of a duty to maintain proper data security.
The law of fiduciary relationships is an evolving one. Courts “have carefully 
refrained from defining instances of fiduciary relations in such a manner that 
other and perhaps new cases might be excluded.”65 Courts apply a multifactor 
analysis to determine whether a fiduciary relationship exists. These factors 
include “[T]he degree of kinship of the parties; the disparity in age, health, 
and mental condition; education and business experience between the parties; 
and the extent to which the allegedly subservient party entrusted the handling 
of . . . business affairs to the other and reposed faith and confidence in [that 
person or entity].”66 Courts have likened relationships between patients and 
physicians as well as attorneys and clients to fiduciary relationships.67
The courts generally look for two basic attributes of the relationship: 
(1) disparities in power and (2) one party’s placing trust in the other party. 
The first attribute is clearly present in many of our relationships with the com-
panies that gather our personal data. We often lack an ability to bargain over 
the security of our information and the way it is transferred to others. More-
over, we often are not well informed of the current and potential uses of our 
information. The second attribute is more complicated. For the companies we 
do business with, the case is strong. We entrust them with our personal infor-
mation with the understanding that they will keep it secure. But what about 
all of the companies that we never do business with that troll about gathering 
up our data? We don’t even have a relationship with these companies. They 
just take our data—often secretly, without our knowledge.
But the law of fiduciary relationships is a flexible one, and it would not be 
too much of an expansion of the concept to apply it to the collectors and users 
of personal information. My argument is not that existing legal doctrine will 
readily work, but that it has the necessary underlying conceptions to respond 
to the problem of insecurity. Currently, our relationships to data collectors 
are perceived to be ones in which there is little accountability and responsibil-
ity. By rethinking them as more analogous to fiduciary relationships, we will 
recognize that the collection and use of personal data carries with it profound 
obligations.
What duties should data collectors and users have? Courts have held that 
doctors, banks, and schools have a duty to keep personal information confi-
dential.68 It is not a stretch to conclude that the fiduciary has a duty to keep 
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a person’s private information secure. The best source for fiduciary duties of 
companies that maintain our personal information are the Fair Information 
Practices. Originally devised in 1973 in a report by the U.S. Department of 
Housing, Education, and Welfare, the Fair Information Practices consist of a 
series of principles about rights and responsibilities pertaining to the use of 
personal data:
?? There must be no personal-data record-keeping systems whose very exis-
tence is secret.
?? There must be a way for an individual to find out what information about 
him is in a record and how it is used.
?? There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about him 
obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for other pur-
poses without his consent.
?? There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a record of 
identifiable information about him.
?? Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records 
of identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their 
intended use and must take reasonable precautions to prevent misuse of 
the data.69
If we recognize that the companies that keep our data owe duties to us, then 
the Fair Information Practices are the most coherent and well-established set 
of duties that have been articulated for the use of personal data.
Once we change the way we think about the harms caused by insecurity as 
well as the responsibility companies bear for these harms, then we can bring 
the law to recognize the most appropriate focal point for responding to infor-
mation abuses.
B. Tort Remedies Against Businesses
Even if the law concludes that the companies maintaining our personal data 
bear responsibility for information abuses, it will still be difficult for individ-
uals to pursue remedies. For actual misuses of information, the law will have 
the least trouble understanding the nature of the harm. As discussed earlier, 
however, focusing on misuses will present difficulties because it is often hard 
to establish a causal connection between specific companies that served as the 
source of the data used by an information abuser. The most effective tool in 
improving data security is redressing leaks and insecurity.
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One option is to turn to tort law. Under existing tort law, there are at least 
two theories about how leaks or insecurity could be recognized as causing 
cognizable injury. First, leaks or insecurity can cause emotional distress. Sec-
ond, leaks or insecurity can increase the risk of future harm.
1. Emotional Distress
Leaks or insecurity can cause emotional distress. Of course, the strongest case 
for emotional distress is when a victim suffers from an actual information 
misuse. Identity theft causes significant anxiety and emotional trauma when 
people experience the destruction of their financial reputations. But what 
about leaks or insecurity? Because most leaks and insecurity are the result 
of negligence, the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress would be a 
potential remedy.
However, courts are especially reluctant to award damages when the emo-
tional distress does not arise out of a more concrete injury, such as bodily 
harm.70 Thus many courts have held that damages for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress cannot exist alone; they must be accompanied by other phys-
ical injuries.71 For example, in Doe v. Chao,72 the Department of Labor used coal 
mine workers’ SSNs as their identifying numbers for their black lung benefits 
claims. Administrative law judges issued public hearing notices listing miners’ 
names and SSNs. The judges also used the numbers in their decisions, which 
were made public.73 A group of miners sued under the federal Privacy Act. Buck 
Doe, the lead plaintiff, testified that “[H]e was ‘greatly concerned and worried’ 
about the disclosure of his SSN; that he felt his privacy had been violated in 
‘words he cannot describe’; that he felt the consequences of the disclosure of his 
SSN could be ‘devastating’ for himself and his wife; and that the disclosure of 
his SSN had ‘torn [him] all to pieces.’ “74 The court held that emotional distress 
damages cannot be established by a “plaintiff ’s own conclusory allegations that 
he felt ‘embarrassed,’ ‘degraded,’ or ‘devastated,’ and suffered a loss of self-es-
teem.”75 Doe “did not produce any evidence of tangible consequences stemming 
from his alleged angst over the disclosure of his SSN. He claimed no medical or 
psychological treatment, no purchase of medications (prescription or over-the-
counter), no impact on his behavior, and no physical consequences.”76 The U.S. 
Supreme Court held that because Doe couldn’t establish actual damages, he was 
not entitled to any liquidated damages under the Privacy Act.77
The reason why courts are reluctant to award damages for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress is that they often view emotional distress damages 
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“with suspicion” because of “concerns over genuineness, reliability, and the 
specter of unlimited liability for trivial losses.”78 However, the law has made 
profound progress in recognizing mental and emotional injuries. Originally, 
the law provided no protection to such harms.79 Later on, in what became 
known as the “impact rule,” tort law recognized emotional distress damages 
when the distress arose out of physical injuries.80 Many jurisdictions expanded 
the impact rule beyond requiring an initial physical injury to allowing for 
recovery of emotional distress when it had “physical manifestations.”81 The 
expansion continued when the law began to permit recovery of emotional dis-
tress that arose when a person was not physically injured but was within the 
“zone of physical danger.”82 The law has taken further steps, allowing recovery 
for bystanders not within the zone of physical impact who witness loved ones 
being hurt. In Dillon v. Legg,83 a mother witnessed the death of her daughter 
in a car accident, but the mother was not in the zone of danger. The court 
permitted recovery based on negligent infliction of emotional distress. Dillon 
is now followed in many states,84 but it has strict guidelines that limit recov-
ery based on the plaintiff ’s observing the event and the relationship between 
the plaintiff and the injured party.85 The clear trend is that the law is devel-
oping toward easing the restrictions on recovery for emotional harm. Many 
obstacles to recovery remain, however, and courts are still quite reluctant to 
recognize emotional distress alone as a cognizable injury.
The difficulty that will plague any form of tort remedy for emotional dis-
tress caused by a leak or insecurity is that damages are likely to be small. 
Although many people may experience some anxiety over data leaks and inse-
curity, it is the rare case in which the mental trauma is severe enough to war-
rant substantial damages. If claims are aggregated, however, a suit may have 
more punch, and injunctive relief could go far to rectify the problem.
2. Risk of Future Harm
Another potential tort doctrine that might be employed to remedy leaks and 
insecurity emerges from a growing number of cases that remedies the creation 
of a risk of suffering future harm. The potential future harm that a person 
could suffer from insecurity or leaks includes identity theft; harm to repu-
tation; being hindered in obtaining jobs, loans, or licenses; and emotional 
distress. Petriello v. Kalman86 involved a medical malpractice suit in which 
a physician used excessive suction to remove a fetus that had died in utero. 
As a result, damage was caused to the plaintiff ’s intestines, and it required 
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repair with a bowel resection, which involved removing part of the intestine. 
The plaintiff produced evidence that as a result of this injury, she would have 
between an 8 percent to 16 percent chance that she would suffer a future bowel 
obstruction.87 The court noted that under existing law “[i]f a plaintiff can 
prove that there exists a 51 percent chance that his injury is permanent or that 
future injury will result, he may receive full compensation for that injury as 
if it were a certainty. If, however, the plaintiff establishes only a 49 percent 
chance of such a consequence, he may recover nothing for the risk to which he 
is presently exposed.”88 The court found fault with this system, because it pro-
duced an all-or-nothing standard. The result is that “a significant number of 
persons receive compensation for future consequences that never occur and, 
conversely, a significant number of persons receive no compensation at all for 
consequences that later ensue from risks not arising to the level of probabil-
ity.”89 Therefore the court concluded that the plaintiff should be compensated 
for the increased risk of developing the bowel obstruction “to the extent that 
the future harm is likely to occur.”90
Courts have begun allowing people to sue for medical malpractice that 
results in the loss of an “opportunity to obtain a better degree of recovery.”91 
Under this approach, the plaintiff “does not receive damages for the entire 
injury, but just for the lost opportunity.”92 In one case, in which the doctor 
argued that the damages were too difficult to calculate, the court concluded 
that this difficulty should not be a reason to deny recovery and “loss of op-
portunity is not inherently unquantifiable.”93 Allowing people to recover for 
potential future harm made more likely by the tortious conduct or the loss of 
a chance to improve one’s condition is a rather new development in tort law, 
occurring primarily over the past twenty years.94 Damages can include those 
“directly resulting from the loss of a chance of achieving a more favorable out-
come,” as well as damages “for the mental distress from the realization that 
the patient’s prospects of avoiding adverse past or future harm were tortiously 
destroyed or reduced,” and damages “for the medical costs of monitoring the 
condition in order to detect and respond to a recurrence or complications.”95
Translated into the domain of information security, tort law would recog-
nize the condition of insecurity as a breach of a duty—a fiduciary one or per-
haps an ordinary duty of care. The harm of vulnerability would then be recti-
fied by damages for the increased possibility of harm from identity theft, the 
mental distress caused by the increased vulnerability, and any costs needed to 
protect oneself against harms that could arise from the vulnerability.
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A problem is that if we applied remedies for insecurity broadly, many 
kinds of insecurity could potentially become tortious. Suppose that a reckless 
driver drives aggressively and carelessly, increasing other drivers’ potential 
to be involved in an accident. The law would certainly balk at compensat-
ing all of these other drivers for the increased risk. But in other cases the law 
does remedy increased risk of harm. As illustrated earlier, the law provides 
a remedy for increased risk of developing health complications as a result of 
medical malpractice. One reason for this difference is that once the reckless 
driver passes by, the risk has been survived and is over. In contrast, the risk of 
developing future complications from medical malpractice is continuing.
Security flaws fit uneasily between these two situations. Unlike medical 
malpractice, which produces a permanent increased risk of developing a fu-
ture complication, security flaws can be patched up. This alters the risk of 
being victimized by data abuse. On the other hand, the risk caused by inse-
curity is not a once-and-done risk like the reckless driver. It continues until 
the security flaw is fixed. Thus, upon being sued, a company could reform its 
data security practices and eliminate the amount of damages a plaintiff could 
collect. Of course, this is not a total loss to the plaintiff, because bringing the 
suit can induce a company to improve its practices and the plaintiff may be 
able to obtain injunctive relief.
3. The Limits and Potential of Tort Law
In sum, these tort doctrines contain the necessary concepts to redress the leak 
and insecurity harms, but they all have significant problems and limitations 
that hinder their application. I do not mean to suggest that these difficulties 
cannot be overcome, but the road will be a rough one. The law of torts will 
need some creativity and development to be used as a device to induce lasting 
change in security practices.
In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis attempted to rethink privacy 
harms and remedies.96 “[I]n very early times,” they contended, “the law gave a 
remedy only for physical interference with life and property.”97 Subsequently, 
the law expanded to recognize incorporeal injuries: “[f]rom the action of bat-
tery grew that of assault. Much later there came a qualified protection of the 
individual against offensive noises and odors, against dust and smoke, and 
excessive vibration. The law of nuisance was developed.”98 Along this trend, 
the law recognized protection to people’s reputations.99 Furthermore, “[f]rom 
corporeal property arose the incorporeal rights issuing out of it; and then 
there opened the wide realm of intangible property, in the products and pro-
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cesses of the mind.”100 Warren and Brandeis were paving the way for the legal 
recognition of remedies for privacy invasions, which often involve not a physi-
cal interference but an “injury to the feelings.”101
Since the Warren and Brandeis article, the law has come a long way in 
recognizing privacy harms. Among other things, people can find legal redress 
for disclosures of embarrassing true information about their private lives, for 
intrusions into their seclusion and solitude, and for a host of other types of 
harms.102 Today, new abuses such as leaks and insecurity are becoming more 
prevalent, and they are currently not well-recognized by the law. Tort law is 
much more advanced than it was in Warren and Brandeis’s day. Basic under-
lying concepts are in place, and the law even partially recognizes the kinds of 
harms that leaks and insecurity create. The critical question, then, is whether 
tort law will take the next step.
C. Constitutional Remedies Against the Government
With regard to the data practices of the government, the constitutional right to 
information privacy could conceivably provide a remedy. In Whalen v. Roe,103 
the Court concluded that the right to privacy protects not only “independence 
in making certain kinds of important decisions” but also the “individual 
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.”104 The case involved a 
government record system of individuals who were taking prescriptions for 
certain medications. Although the government promised that the informa-
tion was confidential and secure, the plaintiffs contended that they feared the 
possibility of the information leaking out. The Court concluded that because 
the security was adequate, the state had met its constitutional obligations. In 
a key passage in the case, the Court stated,
We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of 
vast amounts of personal information in computerized data banks or other 
massive government files. . . . The right to collect and use such data for public 
purposes is typically accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory 
duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures. . . . [I]n some circumstances that duty 
has its roots in the Constitution.105
Therefore, according to the Court in Whalen, when the government main-
tains personal information, it has the responsibility to keep it secure.
The constitutional right to information privacy is a work in progress. Al-
though the Supreme Court has done little to develop it, the right has been 
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recognized in a majority of circuit courts.106 Therefore, the constitutional 
right to information privacy has the potential to develop into a way for peo-
ple to ensure that the government keep their information secure. People can 
bring Bivens or § 1983 actions for damages and injunctions. In this way, the 
constitutional right to information privacy can work as a tort action against 
the government for shoddy security. It can also limit the extent to which the 
government permits public access to personal information.
States that do not adequately account for privacy in their public record laws 
may be found to violate the constitutional right to information privacy. Because 
some of the personal information disclosed in public record systems can facili-
tate the commission of identity theft and other misuses, disclosure can com-
promise a person’s security. For example, one court clerk in Cincinnati placed 
an entire county’s court records on the Internet. A person whose speeding ticket 
was posted on the Website had his identity stolen because the ticket contained a 
treasure trove of personal information, including the person’s SSN.107
At least one court has recognized that the dissemination of information in 
public records can implicate the constitutional right to information privacy. In 
Kallstrom v. City of Columbus,108 a city disclosed law enforcement officials’ per-
sonnel files to defense counsel of alleged drug conspirators (whom the officials 
had investigated). The personnel files included the officer’s names, addresses, 
phone numbers, financial information, social security numbers, and responses 
to questions about their personal lives, as well as the names, addresses, and 
phone numbers of immediate family members.109 The city disclosed to avert a 
violation of Ohio’s Public Records Act, which makes records available to the 
public unless the record falls within an enumerated exemption. The Act did 
not have a privacy exemption. The court held that the disclosures created a 
serious risk to the “personal security and bodily integrity” of the plaintiffs and 
their families.110 Applying strict scrutiny, the court held that the disclosure 
violated the constitutional right to information privacy because it did not fur-
ther the public’s understanding of law enforcement agencies.111
Therefore the constitutional right to information privacy imposes upon 
the government a responsibility to keep the data it collects secure and con-
fidential absent an overriding consideration on the other side of the scale. 
However, this way of applying the constitutional right to information privacy 
may meet resistance in the courts, especially given the germinal and uncer-
tain status of the right.
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D. Structural Remedies
Insecurity harms are difficult to rectify with individual tort suits, because 
damages are harder to establish and people are often given so little informa-
tion about a company’s security practices that it will be difficult for them to 
find out enough to bring a suit. Therefore the most effective means for re-
forming the architecture must be more systematic than what individual rem-
edies can provide. Although I believe individual remedies are an important 
tool, a system of regulation will be better able to improve security at a more 
global level. Information security must be regulated by a national agency with 
the appropriate expertise to understand information privacy issues.
Thus far, the FTC has been attempting to develop such a regulatory sys-
tem. Beginning in 1998, the Federal Trade Commission has been expanding 
its reach by bringing actions against businesses that breach their own privacy 
policies. According to the FTC, such breaches are “unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in or affecting commerce.”112 Armed with the power to bring civil 
actions and obtain injunctions, the FTC has initiated a number of cases, prac-
tically all resulting in settlements.113 Several of these cases involved improp-
erly disclosed or leaked data.
There are indications that the FTC is expanding its reach beyond leaks 
to insecurity harms. In particular, the FTC charged that Microsoft’s .NET 
Passport, which allows Internet users to use a single username and password 
to log in to a variety of participating Websites, was not providing adequate 
security, which it had promised in its privacy policy. Microsoft settled with 
the FTC, and it promised to improve its security.114 The Passport case marks 
a very important new development in FTC enforcement. The FTC appears to 
have recognized security harms as cognizable. In another recent case, In re 
Guess.com, Inc.,115 the FTC brought an action against Guess for having shoddy 
security for its customers’ personal data in violation of its privacy policy.
There are many reasons to remain skeptical about the FTC’s ability to de-
velop into the kind of national privacy agency needed to reform the security 
of our digital dossiers. The FTC’s jurisdiction is limited, and the enforcement 
of privacy is not its primary mission.116 Another limitation with the FTC is 
that it thus far only ensures that companies follow the promises they make in 
their privacy policies.117 But there is a way around this limitation contained in a 
 little-known provision of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB) Act. The GLB Act re-
quires the various agencies that regulate financial companies to enact “admin-
istrative, technical, and physical safeguards for personal information.”118 These 
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regulations promulgated under the GLB Act are rather vague, but they could 
be used to enable agencies such as the FTC to bring actions to force companies 
to abandon the use of SSNs and other readily available personal information as 
passwords. Unfortunately, this kind of insecurity has not been recognized by 
the FTC. The focus on information security has thus far been centered around 
technology, not around these basic business practices that allow easy access to 
personal data.
III. CONCLUSION
We are increasingly vulnerable in the Information Age, and the information 
abuses we are experiencing are the product of business and the government. 
We need to rethink information abuses by understanding insecurity as a cog-
nizable injury and focusing more on the companies maintaining and using our 
personal information. The most effective approach to dealing with information 
abuses is to focus on the bottom of the data security pyramid, not the top.
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